The Study of Internal Control and over-investment on Corporate Credit Risk  by Xu, Chaohui & Zhou, Zongfang
 Procedia Computer Science  91 ( 2016 )  109 – 113 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0509 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2016
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2016.07.047 
ScienceDirect
* Corresponding author. Tel.:1-822-761-3964. 
E-mail address: 405191467@qq.com. 
Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM2016) 
The study of internal control and over-investment  
on corporate credit risk 
Chaohui Xua,*, Zongfang Zhoua  
 
a
School of management and economics, UESTC, Chengdu, 610054, China 
Abstract 
This paper is based on a sample of A-stock Chinese listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from year 2009 
to 2013, studying the impact of over-investment on the corporate credit risk, testing whether the improvement of the 
internal control quality can effectively control the credit risk resulted from the over-investment. The basic method adopted 
in this paper is to combine the theoretical analyses with the demonstration proof-test, while including the model of linear 
regression. 
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1. Introduction 
At present, Chinese government has realized the problems of duplicate construction and over-
investment(Peihong Yang, 2006) [1], and taken innovation as a new strategy to promote the enterprise growth, 
while a majority of managers take self-profit maximization as the goal and continue to over-investment. The 
economic consequences generated from the over-investment can not only lead to performance decline (Lei Zan 
and Yaoyao Wang, 2013) [2], but also increase the corporate credit risks. By studying the impact of over-
investment on the credit risks in the thesis, it can sound a alarm for enterprise managers. What’s more, the 
thesis will discuss how to reduce the economic consequences generated from the over-investment. 
There's a heated debate among academics about how to eliminate these factors to effectively control the 
managerial over-investment behaviors. Some start from the external factors, like the improvement of the 
governance environment (Yang, 2010)[3], the enhancement of the monitoring effect of bank (Luo, 2012) [4], 
while others from the internal factors, such as the largest shareholder (Zhang, 2008)[5], the improvement of the 
governance of corporation (Fang & Jin, 2013)[6], and strengthen of internal control (Li, 2011) [7], etc. Though 
Li and others have found that the promotion of internal control quality is beneficial to reduce the over-
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investment, yet they don’t make a further study in its economic consequences. Chinese economy is now 
in the process of transforming, executives don't lay emphasis on the role that internal control has played in the 
risk control, and the internal control construction is still led and promoted by the government (Liu, 2012)[8]. 
Based on the fact that over-investment can result in credit risks, this paper mainly discuss that the internal 
control can effectively control these risks, thus not only presenting the vital function of internal control to the 
executives, but providing a theoretical basis for internal control construction by the government. 
2. Literature review and theoretical hypothesis 
2.1. Internal control, the agency problem and the corporate investment decision: theoretical analysis 
Managers have impulse to establish a "private kingdom". The expansion of that impulse leads to over-
investment, which may result from managers pursuing the utility maximization. In order to gain more profits, 
managers will expand the scale of investment. It can be seen that the over-investment does harm to enterprise 
value. How to reduce the over-investment so as to reduce the harm on enterprise value? Internal control is a 
high-profile system that protects the added value of enterprises. Based on this, by establishing models, this 
paper analyzes the motivation of managers to over-invest, and the effects that internal control construction has 
laid on the over-investment. 
Drawing on the method of Aggarwal and Samwick(2006)[9], we make A as the asset value, I as the capital 
investment, and m as the investment-output ratio, 0 2( , )m N Vൄ . The corporate value is as following if there's 
no agency problem:  
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Take a derivative of the model (1), and when the corporate value reaches the maximization, the best 
investment is:
 
bestI m                                                                                                                                        (2) 
Consider the existence of the principal-agent problem, assuming the managers’ expected wealth consists of 
three parts, as the fixed salary 0( )Z , holding the stock value (share holding rate is w ) and expense in-office  
( IlnT ), where T  represents the coefficient of managerial power. When considering the agency problem, the 
firm value is,
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The managers’ expected wealth can be, 
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Furthermore, make derivation of model (4), we can obtain the best investment while the managers’ expected 
wealth reach its maximization, 
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(5) 
After the company has established an internal control system, which may reduce agency costs, especially has 
certain restraint for the managers’ expense in-office. Assuming the restraint role of internal control to 
the managerial abuse power is J ˄0d J d 1˅,if J =1, which means that the construction of internal control 
to managers’ expense in-office with full binding effect; If J =0, which means that the construction of internal 
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control to managers’ expense in-office with no binding. When further consideration enterprises to establish an 
internal control system, the enterprise value can be, 2_ 0
1
( ) (1 )
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(6) 
In this case, the managers’ expected wealth can be, 
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Making derivation of model (5), we can obtain the best investment while the managers’ expected wealth 
reach its maximization, 
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(8) 
Making comparison of model (2) and (5), because share holding rate of the managers ( )w is less than 1, then
_best g bestI I . When the company exist agency problem, in order to pursue the utility maximization, the 
managers will have the tendency to over-invest. Making comparison model (1) and (3), although the managers’ 
behavior of over-investment can meet their own interests, it undermines the enterprise value. 
The over-investment not only fails to create profits and cash flow, but erodes the existing cash flow, which 
may lead to money runs out. The study of Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) also indicates that over-investment 
is always accompanied by the consumption of the free cash flow. Once their own fund is exhausted, with the 
increase of interest-bearing debt ratio, the corporate credit risks will increase as well. However, the over-
investment projects cannot reduce credit risks, but its negative cash flow will intensify them. The transmission 
of credit risks will eventually increase the overall corporate credit risks, and with their accumulation, 
enterprises will potentially fall into bankrupt. Based on the above theoretical analysis, proposed the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The over-investment behaviors of managers will significantly increase the company's credit 
risk. 
Further consider the internal control system, and compare the model (2), (5) and (8). Because
_ _ _best nk g best g bestI I Id d , while improving their internal control systems and operating them effectively, 
enterprises can strongly curb over-investment, and then avoid the value reduction brought by over-investment. 
When =1J , it indicates that internal control can totally curb the over-investment activities of managers, thus 
adding the corporate value. When =0J , it indicates that internal control cannot resolve the agency problems, 
and effectively curb the over-investment activities, thus harming the corporate value. The corporate value 
includes performance and risks, and its reduction suggests the drop of corporate performance and increase of 
corporate risks. As any corporate activity is closely related to their risks, corporate credit risks can 
comprehensively reflect others risks. 
The improvement of internal control will effectively curb the over-investment activities of managers. 
Meanwhile, the study of Fang and Jin (2013) indicates that internal control can lower the information 
asymmetry [6], reduce the investment in the projects whose net cash ratio is negative, thus effectively 
controlling the over-investment activities. Based on this, the thesis has proposed the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis2: The improvement of the internal control can effectively curb the credit risks caused by over-
investment. 
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3. Research and Design  
3.1. Data source 
This paper uses 2009-2013 China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the initial sample 
data, and removed the following sample: (1)The financial listed companies, because the financial data of this 
kind of  listing Corporation have larger differences with generally listed companies;(2) Taking into account the 
impact of IPO, In previous December 31, 2008 as the reference listed companies, excluding 2009 and its 
subsequent listing of the sample;(3) Key indicators for missing values of the sample;(4) The sample of index 
data exists extreme value, because the presence of extreme values may affect the robustness of the 
conclusions;(5) ST and *ST samples have been specially treated, due to these companies have a great risk of 
bankruptcy. In this paper, data from the CSMAR and RESSET database, statistical analysis was performed 
using Stata10.0 software. 
3.2. Variable definitions 
3.2.1Measure overinvestment 
In this paper, with reference to Richardson (2006) model to measure over- investment [10], this model 
suggests that enterprises exist the optimal investment scale, which affected by cash holdings, financial 
leverage,  investment opportunities, listing Corporation age, the scale of the company, the net investment in the 
previous period , profitability and other factors. When the actual investment scale larger than the optimal size 
of the company, namely over-investment, and when the actual investment scale is smaller than the optimal size, 
that is, under-investment. 
3.2.2Corporate credit risk 
There are a variety of measurement model of credit risk of foreign company, however, due to the truth that 
Chinese companies’ credit statistics are not perfect, in this paper, we will use EDF model which developed by 
KMV company to measure the credit risk of listed companies in China. 
3.2.3Internal control 
Using the quality of internal control evaluation index developed by Dibo Enterprise Risk Management, 
Shenzhen Technology Co., Ltd.  
3.2.4Control variables 
Since the company's credit risk is not only affected by the internal control, but also affected by other factors, 
such as cash holdings, financial leverage, investment opportunities, the existing years of listed companies, the 
scale of the company, profitability, industry attributes and annual effect etc. 
3.3. Measurement methods and model selection 
To test hypothesis 1, set up the following model to test: 
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To test hypothesis 2, set up the following model to test:  
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